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Resolving the Doubt About the True Doubt Rule in
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Greenwich Collieries
Participants in legal disputes have been said to determine the
justness of their cases' outcome by the apparent fairness of the
process used to reach resolution.' For processes to be fair the
procedural rules should be designed to serve the broad objectives of
the substantive law to be applied. Coal miners, for example, have
depended until recently on a procedural principle developed in
accordance with policy goals. This principle shifts the burden of
persuasion to an employer once a miner puts forth a prima facie
workers' compensation case showing that he has contracted
pneumoconiosis,2 a degenerative and deadly lung disease often
caused by long-term inhalation of coal dust No matter how fair or
uniform this principle made the process of evaluating pneumoconiosis
claims, however, the United States Supreme Court recently brought
this burden-shifting approach to a screeching halt.
In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Greenwich Collieries,4 the Court faced the question of whether a case
of equal evidence under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA)5 or
1. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 3
(1989).
2. See, e.g., Provance v. United States Steel Corp., 1 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-483 (1978);
see also infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
3. PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG 56-57 (1987). Pneumoconiosis
often is referred to as "black lung disease," but the term "black lung" may refer to a
variety of respiratory and pulmonary diseases. Id. at 66.
4. 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994). The Greenwich decision actually resolved two separate
cases on appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Greenwich Collieries v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993), and
Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 992 F.2d
1277 (3d Cir. 1993). The first case involved a black lung disability claim under the Black
Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), see infra note 5; the second involved a claim brought under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), see infra note 6.
5. The BLBA was originally enacted as Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of several titles in the U.S.C.), to provide a workers' compensation benefits
program for mine workers disabled by black lung disease. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a). Although
state workers' compensation laws served a similar purpose, Congress found those acts
inadequate. BARTH, supra note 3, at 280.
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the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)6
should be resolved in favor of the claimant by applying the so-called
"true doubt rule."7 In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the
Court concluded that under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),s adopted in part by both the BLBA and LHWCA,9 such a
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-45, 947-50 (1988). The LHWCA was enacted in 1927 to
compensate workers in maritime trades who were not covered by any state law provisions.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,37-38 (1932). It was designed to provide benefits without
regard to an employer's fault or an employee's contributory fault. Id. at 38.
7. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254. Once the claimant had put forth enough evidence
to establish a prima facie case that she had a disabling disease, that she was in fact
disabled by it, and that the disease arose from her employment, the true doubt rule
operated to shift the burden of persuasion to the employer. Id. at 2253; infra note 61 and
accompanying text. Although it had been applied for years in principle under the
LHWCA and the BLBA, the name "true doubt rule" did not appear until 1978, when the
Benefits Review Board announced that it would apply a "true doubt rule" to cases under
the BLBA. Provance v. United States Steel Corp., 1 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-483 (1978); see
also infra note 65 and accompanying text. The courts developed the rule as a "judicial
construct designed to effectuate Congress's intent that the Black Lung Benefits Act be
liberally construed to ensure payment to deserving claimants." Freeman United Coal
Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 988 F.2d 706,709-10
(7th Cir. 1993). The rule holds that "when equally probative but contradictory evidence
is [put forward by each side], the evidence must be resolved in favor of the claimant." Id.
at 710. Courts derived the true doubt rule from a 1972 Senate Report that stated: "In the
absence of definitive medical conclusions there is a clear need to resolve doubts in favor
of the disabled miner or his survivors." S. REP. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2315; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
In 1977, the Senate Human Resources Committee re-emphasized Congress's intention to
give miners "the benefit of any doubt." S. REP. No. 209, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977),
reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 96TH CONG., BLACK LUNG
BENEFITS REFORM Acr AND BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVENUE ACT OF 1977, at 616
(1979).
Although the Benefits Review Board had never referred to the favoring of workers'
claims as "applying a true doubt rule," it had employed the same principles embodied in
this "new" rule for decades under the LHWCA. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2259-60 (Souter,
J., dissenting). The practice actually originated in 1932, when the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals first resolved a LHWCA case of equal evidence in favor of a worker and
his family. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Burris, 59 F.2d 1042, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1932); see
also infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
8. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988). Significantly, the APA
was not made applicable to the LHWCA until 1972. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1972). Because the BLBA incorporates parts of the LHWCA, the APA has
applied to the BLBA since it was made applicable to the LHWCA. See Greenwich, 114
S. Ct. at 2254; infra note 9.
9. The APA only applies to those congressional acts that have adopted it in full or
in part. Both the BLBA and the LHWCA have adopted the APA in part, including the
relevant section in Greenwich-§ 7(c). Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1988)
(incorporating parts of the LHWCA that incorporate the APA); Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1988). But see infra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text (presenting the argument that neither the BLBA nor the LHWCA
intended to incorporate § 7(c) of the APA).
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claim could not be resolved in the claimant's favor. ° Although all
of the Justices engaged in historical analysis to arrive at their
opinions, the split decision revealed that the Justices' understandings
of history were not the same. At stake was the meaning of the legal
phrase "burden of proof," as well as the future of the true doubt
rule." In the end, two claimants who had relied on the true doubt
rule were left with worthless claims unless, upon remand, they could
produce more convincing evidence in their favor. After summarizing
the facts, 2 this Note briefly reviews the Greenwich opinion." Next,
the Note sketches the development and application of the true doubt
rule, 4 the evolution of the phrase "burden of proof,"' 5 and the
Court's previous scrutiny of section 7(c) of the APA and the true
doubt rule. 6 The Note then examines the Greenwich opinion in
detail,'7 concluding that the Court may have based its conclusions on
an incomplete historical analysis.' 8 Finally, the Note examines the
likely effects of the Greenwich decision, suggesting that Congress
may act to reinstate use of the true doubt rule in the future.20
Regardless of Congress's reaction, however, the central is-
sue-whether the true doubt rule violates section 7(c) of the APA-is
closed.'
In Greenwich, the Court reviewed two Third Circuit decisions.
The first, Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, involved a claim by Andrew Ondecko for
disability benefits under the BLBA?' A coal miner for thirty-one
years, Ondecko claimed that he had been totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) because of years of exposure to
coal dust?' After a preliminary determination by the Department
10. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2259.
11. Id. at 2255-57; id at 2260-62 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text. For the text of section 7(c), see
infra note 96.
17. See infra notes 108-33 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
22. 990 F.2d 730, 731 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994).
23. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2253. Ondecko filed the claim within a month of ceasing
work in January 1989. Ondecko v. Greenwich Collieries, 1990 BLA LEXIS 1105, at *3,
rev'd sub nom, Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
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of Labor that he had no disease or disability, Ondecko received a
hearing before a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).24 The ALJ relied on the true doubt rule to resolve in
Ondecko's favor the first two elements of his claim: (1) that he had
the disease z and (2) that he was totally disabled by it.26 In ruling
on the third and final element of Ondecko's claim-that his
pneumoconiosis resulted from his work-the ALJ applied the
rebuttable presumption that a claimant who has worked more than
ten years in the mines developed the disease from the job.' After
the Benefits Review Board upheld Ondecko's award,28 the Third
Programs, 990 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994). Ondecko left the job
on the advice of his doctor, after more than seven years of treatment for shortness of
breath. Id. at *8.
24. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731-32.
25. At the hearing, Ondecko and his employer together presented more than 40 x-
rays, along with several different physicians' interpretations, readings, and re-readings.
Ondecko, 1990 BLA LEXIS 1105, at *4-7, *11. Although a considerable number of
physicians' readings concluded that Ondecko had black lung disease, more concluded that
he did not. Id. at *16. Nevertheless, the AJ stated that "the fact that at least one Board-
certified radiologist and B-reader repeatedly found evidence of pneumoconiosis is
significant enough to raise true doubt on the issue of pneumoconiosis." Id. Thus, the
judge applied the true doubt rule to conclude that Ondecko had black lung disease. Id.
26. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2253-54. Total disability in black lung cases may be
established by the results of a blood gas study or a pulmonary function study, by evidence
of pulmonary heart disease, or by physician opinion. Ondecko, 1990 BLA LEXIS 1105,
at *12; see also Black Lung Benefits Act, 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)1-4 (1993) (listing the
standards by which evidence shall establish a miner's total disability). In Ondecko's case,
the blood gas levels were not indicative of total disability, nor was there evidence of cor
pulmonale. Ondecko, 1990 BLA LEXIS 1105, at *17.18. While some of the physicians
concluded Ondecko was so restricted that he was unable to continue his work in the
mines, others disagreed. Id. at *19. These physicians attributed any breathing problems
to Ondecko's cigarette smoking from 1943 to 1967 and pipe smoking from 1967 to 1986,
and concluded that he was not totally disabled. Id. at *19 & n.12. Finding that he could
infer from several physicians' testimony that Ondecko was prevented from performing his
usual work in the coal mines, the AIl concluded that "the fact that the Claimant's treating
physician considers him totally disabled [raises] true doubt in face of the Employer's ex-
perts['] opinions. As stated above, true doubt is to be resolved in favor of the Claimant."
Id. at *21.
27. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254. The AL applied § 718.203(b) of the BLBA, which
states: "If a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for
ten years or more in one or more coal mines, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that
the pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment." See Black Lung Benefits Act, 20
C.F.R. § 718.203(b) (1993) (explaining how to establish the relationship of pneumoconiosis
to the employment); Ondecko, 1990 BLA LEXIS 1105, at *17. Since Greenwich Collieries
could not produce evidence of an alternative cause of the pneumoconiosis, the ALJ ruled
in favor of Ondecko. Id.
28. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 731. Greenwich argued to the Board that several sections
of the United States Code (5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1988)) adopted in the BLBA
required that all propositions in Ondecko's claim be proven by a preponderance of the
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Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Board's ruling on the theory
that the true doubt rule violated the BLBA and conflicted with prece-
dent.29 Following the court's ruling, the Department of Labor
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.3"
The second case, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs v. Maher Terminals, Inc., involved a claim by the widow of
Michael Santoro under the LHWCA.3" The claim alleged that a
work-related injury to her husband's back and neck rendered him
disabled and led to his death.32 The ALJ found the evidence on
both sides of the claim equally probative and applied the true doubt
rule to resolve the claim in Santoro's favor.33 The Benefits Review
Board affirmed the ALl's decision, and Maher Terminals appealed.34
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ALI's ruling,
holding that the true doubt rule violated section 7(c) of the APA.35
The Department of Labor appealed the court of appeals' decision to
the Supreme Court.36 Because the Third Circuit decisions in both
Greenwich and Maher had invalidated the true doubt rule, the
evidence. Id. If true, such a requirement would invalidate the use of the true doubt rule
because the rule only requires that prima facie evidence equal to the employer's be put
forward by the claimant. Id.; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
29. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 735-37. These two conclusions actually went hand-in-hand.
The court of appeals applied the Supreme Court's holding in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 138 (1987)-that a claimant
must prove the existence of pneumoconiosis by a preponderance of the evidence-to
conclude that Ondecko had not produced sufficient evidence. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 733.
The court of appeals then examined § 718 of the BLBA, which states, in pertinent part,
that "the burden of proving a fact alleged in connection with any provision of this part
shall rest with the party making such allegations." Black Lung Benefits Act, 20 C.F.R. §
718.403 (1993), quoted in Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734. The court concluded that the Act's
use of the term "proving" placed a burden of persuasion on the claimant that also
precluded use of the true doubt rule. Greenwich, 990 F.2d at 734. Thus, the two
conclusions were consistent.
30. Brief for Petitioner Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
Department of Labor at 1, Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (No. 93-744).
31. 992 F.2d 1277, 1278 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994).
32. See id. at 1278-79. Santoro was injured while driving a vehicle off of a ship for
Maher Terminals, Inc.; he had to jerk back to avoid a shackle swinging toward him. Id.
at 1279. Several weeks later Santoro was diagnosed with a tumor on his spinal cord, and
he died within eight months. Id. at 1279. There was extensive medical evidence at the
hearing to establish a link between the injury at work, Santoro's subsequent disability, and
the nerve cancer that killed him. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254; Maher, 992 F.2d at
1279.
33. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254.
34. Id.
35. See Maher, 992 F.2d at 1281-83, 1285.
36. Petitioner's Brief at 1, Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. 2251 (No. 93-744).
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Department of Labor appealed the cases together.37 Noting that the
Third Circuit's conclusions on the true doubt rule contradicted a
recent decision in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,3" the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the proper
application of section 7(c) of the APA.39
A divided Supreme Court' affirmed the Third Circuit decisions,
holding that the true doubt rule may no longer be applied to settle
claims under the BLBA or the LHWCA because it violates section
7(c).41 The majority first found that section 7(c) of the APA applies
to administrative proceedings under the LHWCA42 and the
BLBA.43 The Court then determined that the proper meaning of
"burden of proof" as used in section 7(c) of the APA was "burden of
persuasion" rather than mere "burden of production."" In reaching
its conclusion, the majority sought to "ascertain the ordinary meaning
of 'burden of proof' in 1946, the year the APA was enacted., 45 The
37. Id.
38. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254 (explaining that the Third Circuit's decisions directly
conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 988 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993)).
39. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114
S. Ct. 751 (1994).
40. The Court split six to three. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2253. Joining in Justice
O'Connor's opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Ginsburg. Id at 2253. Joining in the dissenting opinion were Justices Souter,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 2259 (Souter, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2259.
42. Id. at 2254. The Department of Labor argued that the LHWCA was not intended
to employ § 7(c) of the APA because the "Board shall not be bound by common law or
statutory rules of evidence or by ... rules of procedure, except as provided by this
chapter." Id. at 2254 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 923(a) (1988) (quotation omitted)). The
majority responded by explaining that "assignment of the burden of proof is a rule of
substantive law," so it is "not clear whether this [section] even applies." Greenwich, 114
S. Ct. at 2254 (citing American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 988 (1994)). More
important, the majority pointed out that the LHWCA explicitly states that hearings under
the Act will be "conducted in accordance with [the APA]." Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1988).
43. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2254. The Department of Labor argued that the
regulations state that "Congress intended that claimants be given the benefit of all
reasonable doubt as to the existence of ... disability," id. (quoting Black Lung Benefits
Act, 20 C.F.R. § 718.3(c) (1993) (quotation omitted)), and "[the LHWCA is to be
incorporated] except as otherwise provided ... by regulations of the Secretary." Id.
(quoting 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1988) (quotation omitted)). The Department of Labor
contended that these provisions together allowed the Secretary to apply the true doubt
rule, regardless of APA regulations, in order to aid claimants as Congress intended. Id.
The majority responded that "the regulation fail[s] to mention the true doubt rule or § 7(c)
... [or] burden shifting or burdens of proof [and thus] does not overcome the presumption
that.., adjudications under the BLBA are subject to § 7(c)." Id.
44. Id. at 2257.
45. Id. at 2255.
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Court concluded that although "burden of proof" had been used to
mean "burden of production" throughout the nineteenth century, its
meaning as "burden of persuasion" had become settled some two
decades prior to the enactment of the APA.4  Assuming that
Congress, upon adoption of the APA, intended "burden of proof" to
have the same meaning as that generally accepted in the legal
community at the time, the majority reasoned that Congress intended
the APA's use to mean "burden of persuasion."'  The Court
therefore held that the true doubt rule was invalid under the APA.4
Justice Souter, writing for the dissenters,4 9 agreed that section
7(c) of the APA applied to the LHWCA and the BLBA, but
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "burden of proof.""
According to the dissenters, the meaning of the phrase was still
unsettled in 194651 and the best evidence of congressional intent is
found in House and Senate reports on the APA at the time of its
enactment." In light of that legislative history, the dissenters
believed that Congress intended to impose only a "burden of
46. Id. at 2257. The majority examined various treatises and court cases on the
meaning of "burden of proof' and pointed to Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923), as the
Supreme Court case that clarified the meaning of the term. In Hill, the Court adopted the
reasoning of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
who in 1833 had determined that "burden of proof' means "burden of persuasion."
Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2256 (citing Powers v. Russell, 30 Mass. 69 (1833)). The majority
then cited several cases decided between 1923 and 1945 to show that the Court had
consistently used "burden of proof' to mean "burden of persuasion" after Hill. Id. at
2256. Finally, the Court showed that Congress, when it enacted the APA, was aware of
the distinction the Court was using because it had explicitly distinguished "burden of
persuasion" from "burden of proof' in the Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 2257; see
also 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(e), 312(d) (1988) (using language supporting a distinction between
"burden of proof' and burden of producing evidence).
47. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257. Certainly, in the absence of any evidence suggesting
Congress intended otherwise, it would be proper to assume that Congress used the phrase
in accordance with its accepted meaning at the time of enactment. See Greenwich, 114 S.
Ct. at 2557 (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1312
(1992); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979)).
48. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct at 2255.
49. Id. at 2259 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in the
dissent. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra note 40.
50. Id. at 2260 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissenters pointed to several treatises and cases
between the decision in Hill (relied on by the majority) and the enactment of the APA
that suggested the phrase "burden of proof" was still being used in 1946 to mean both
"burden of persuasion" and "burden of production." Id. at 2260-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
But cf. supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing Greenwich majority's argument
that "burden of proof' has been used since Hill to mean only "burden of persuasion").
52. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2261-62 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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production" on the proponent of a rule or order. 3 They would have
upheld the true doubt rule as consistent with section 7(c).54
Greenwich was decided in the wake of decades of confusion over
the meaning of one of the judicial system's most familiar phrases.55
In trying to define "burden of proof" as that phrase is used in the
APA, the Court was challenged by the humanitarian function of the
true doubt rule,56 the history of dual meanings for "burden of
proof, 57 and the peaceful coexistence for nearly half a century of
section 7(c) of the APA and the true doubt rule.58
The concept of the true doubt rule was first articulated in
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Burris. 9 The court observed that workers'
compensation laws were developed because of the notion that those
best able to bear the burden should compensate victims of faultless
accidents.' In applying this general principle, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals began the practice of resolving compen-
sation claims with equal evidence on both sides in favor of the
claimant.61 The practice continued for more than fifty years under
the LHWCA and has been applied even more frequently under the
BLBA since its passage in 1969.62
Although various courts of appeals approved of the practice
initiated in Burris,63 the term "true doubt rule" seems to have arisen
53. Id. at 2262 (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2267 (Souter, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2255; see also JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 355-84 (1898). Black's Law Dictionary suggests that
"burden of proof" may mean burden of producing a preponderance of the evidence or
burden of coming forward with the evidence, but gives no preference for either meaning.
See BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 196-97 (6th ed. 1990).
56. The rule is derived from Congress's desire to favor injured workers' claims. See
supra note 7; infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
59. 59 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1932); see also Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 992 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct.
2251 (1994) (indicating that the true doubt rule first appeared in Burris).
60. Burris, 59 F.2d at 1044.
61. Stephen Yula, Recent Decision, Workers' Compensation-Black Lung Benefits
Act-True Doubt Rule, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 361, 366 (1994).
62. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct at 2259-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. See Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that the
Commissioner at an LHWCA hearing is to resolve all doubtful fact questions in favor of
the injured employee) (citing J.V. Vozzolo, Inc. v. Britton, 377 F.2d 144, 147 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Howell v. Einbinder, 350 F.2d 442, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Hancock v. Einbinder,
310 F.2d 872, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v.
Donovan, 251 F.2d 915, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Friend v. Britton, 220 F.2d 820, 821 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); Southern Pacific Co. v. Sheppeard, 112 F.2d 147, 148 (5th Cir. 1940); Hartford
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since Congress implemented the BLBA. According to a Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals panel that investigated the rule,' the term
"derives from a Senate Report accompanying the 1972 amendments
to the black lung program which noted that the Act 'is intended to be
a remedial law ... In the absence of definitive medical conclusions
there is a clear need to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled miner
or his survivors.' "' Although the endorsement of favorable treat-
ment of miners' claims was clear from the Senate report and the
Congressional mandate accompanying the BLBA, it was not until
1978 that the Benefits Review Board announced that they would
apply a "true-doubt rule" to decide black lung cases.6
Challenges to the use of the true doubt rule, such as those raised
by the employers in Greenwich, began surfacing in the late 1980s and
continued to increase in number during the early 1990s.67 These
cases consistently affirmed ALJs' use of the true doubt rule in black
lung cases,' with the exceptions of Greenwich and Maher.69 Those
courts of appeals that found the true doubt rule consistent with the
APA often suggested that the United States Supreme Court had given
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1940)).
64. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs, 988 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
65. Freeman, 988 F.2d at 710 (quoting S. REP. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2315).
66. See Grizzle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1096 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993)
(citing Provance v. United States Steel Corp., 1 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-483 (1978)). The
Senate report language is obviously close to the language employed by many courts that
applied the true doubt rule to LHWCA cases, and it seems plausible that many ALJs
applied the "rule" without the formal term long before Provance. Nevertheless, in his
dissent in an important 1987 black lung case, Justice Marshall stated that "the Director has
failed to bring to our attention ... one instance in which the true-doubt rule actually has
been applied by an ALJ in evaluating a miner's claim." Mullins Coal v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 163 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But
see infra note 70 (indicating that AIls applied the true doubt rule to numerous cases prior
to Mullins Coal).
67. See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1993); Freeman
United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 999 F.2d
291,292-93 (7th Cir. 1993); Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096-97; Skukan v. Consolidation Coal Co.,
993 F.2d 1228, 1236 (6th Cir. 1993); Freeman, 988 F.2d at 709; Greer v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 940 F.2d 88, 90 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991); Old Ben Coal
Co. v. Luker, 826 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1987). Several cases are still pending that
reached the courts of appeals after the Supreme Court's decision in Greenwich to examine
the true doubt rule in light of the regulations of the APA. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Battram, 7 F.3d at 1277; Freeman, 999 F.2d at 292; Grizzle, 994 F.2d at
1096; Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1236; Freeman, 988 F.2d at 712; Greer, 940 F.2d at 91; Luker,
826 F.2d at 692.
69. As noted earlier, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard both of these cases.
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its approval to the use of the true doubt rule in dictum.' Regardless
of their conclusions, though, the courts of appeals that examined the
true doubt rule faced the same task that the Court faced in Green-
wich: how to interpret "burden of proof" as used in section 7(c) of
the APA.71
Little doubt exists that at the turn of the century the term
"burden of proof' was used in various ways in both American and
British courts.' The two most prominent meanings, and the two
meanings at issue in Greenwich, were "burden of going forward with
the evidence" (also referred to as "burden of production") and
"burden of persuasion."'73 "Burden of proof," when used to mean
"burden of going forward with the evidence," means that the party
with the burden of proof has to come forward with prima facie
evidence to support its propositions.74 Quite distinct from this
burden is the "burden of persuasion," which imposes a duty on the
party making a proposition to establish that proposition by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.75
70. These courts of appeals were referring to dictum in Mullins Coal, a case in which
the Court was examining the "burden of proof that the claimant must satisfy to invoke"
an interim presumption of eligibility for black lung benefits. Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 138;
Petitioner's Brief, at 6 nA, Greenwich (No. 93-744). Although the questions presented
were similar to those in Greenwich, the Court carefully avoided an actual examination of
the true doubt rule in Mullins Coal. See Freeman, 999 F.2d at 293.
Nevertheless, the Court did repeat the Secretary's words about the true doubt rule:
"The Act embodies the principle that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the claimant, and
that principle plays an important role in claims determinations both under the interim
presumption and otherwise." Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 156 n.29 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 36826
(1978)). Moreover, the Mullins Coal Court noted that the Benefits Review Board " 'has
consistently upheld the principle that, where true doubt exists, that doubt shall be resolved
in favor of the claimant.' " Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 144 n.12 (quoting Lessar v. C.F. &
I. Steel Corp., 3 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-63, 1-68 (1981)). Several courts of appeals
concluded that the Court's acknowledgement of the Secretary's words and the Benefits
Review Board's practice, without its disapproval, was effectively approval of the true doubt
rule by the Court. See Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096 n.3; Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1235; Greer, 940
F.2d at 90 n.3.
71. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255.
72. THAYER, supra note 55, at 355-84.
73. Since the APA applies to hearings in which the true doubt rule is used, this
distinction is paramount. If § 7(c)'s "burden of proof' is merely a burden of production,
then the true doubt rule escapes its application unscathed because this is exactly the
burden that the rule imposes on the claimant. However, if it imposes a "burden of
persuasion," then the true doubt rule is clearly inappropriate. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct.
at 2255.




The confusion at the turn of the century frustrated legal
scholars,76 causing many to support efforts to clear up the ambiguity
of the phrase7 A leading solution to the problem was the one
offered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Powers v.
Russell. 8 In that case, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw stated: "Where
the party having the burden of proof establishes a prima facie case,
and no proof to the contrary is offered, he will prevail .... [T]he
other party.., must produce evidence of equal or greater weight...
or he will fail., 79
The United States Supreme Court, perhaps welcoming the
opportunity to clear up the ambiguity, attempted to adopt the
Massachusetts approach with its 1923 decision in Hill v. Smith.'
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes even suggested that
the distinction drawn by the Massachusetts court was "now very
generally accepted."'" Although Holmes's conclusion is doubtful,'m
the Court made a valiant attempt in Hill to limit the meaning of
"burden of proof" to "burden of persuasion." In the years following
Hill, the Court distinguished its own use of the terms "burden of
proof" and "burden of going forward with the evidence" in many
cases.' However, even Justice Holmes was compelled to admit in
76. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255 (citing 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
2486-87, 3524-29 (1905)).
77. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255; see, e.g., Smith v. Hill, 232 Mass. 188, 190 (1919);
Powers v. Russell, 30 Mass. 69,76-77 (1833); see also supra notes 46,79 and accompanying
text. The majority referred to the comments of Charles Chamberlayne and Justice Thayer,
who both sought to narrow the meaning of "burden of proof" from two meanings to one.
See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2255-56; THAYER, supra note 55, at 384-85; 2 CHARLES
FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 936, 1096-98 (1911).
78. 30 Mass. 69 (1833).
79. 1& at 76 (emphasis added); see also supra note 46.
80. 260 U.S. 592 (1923), affg Smith v. Hill, 232 Mass. 188, 190 (1919); see also supra
note 46.
81. Hill, 260 U.S. at 594 (supporting the distinction between burden of proof and
burden of "producing evidence to meet that already produced" drawn by the court below);
see also Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2256 (quoting Holmes in Hil).
82. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
83. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2256. The majority cited a number of decisions in which
the Court, between the Hill decision and the APA's enactment in 1946, recognized that
"burden of proof" imposed a "burden of persuasion." See id. (citing Webre Steib Co. v.
Commissioner, 324 U.S. 164,171 (1945) (noting that a claimant bears the "burden of going
forward with evidence ... as well as the burden of proof"); Commercial Molasses Corp.
v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 111 (1941) (stating that the party with the
burden of proof has the burden of persuasion, but the opposing party may have the
burden of production); Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng'g Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1934) (holding that the party bearing the burden of proof bears the burden of
persuasion); Brosnan v. Brosnan, 263 U.S. 345,349 (1923) (noting that the burden of proof
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Hill that the distinction the Court tried to make was still "blurred by
careless speech."'
Such "careless speech" apparently continued even after the Hill
opinion. According to several legal treatises published in the late
1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s, the confusion over the meaning of
"burden of proof" still existed. 5 One treatise serves as a testimony
to the general state of confusion:
The expression "burden of proof" has not a fixed and
unvarying meaning and application. On the contrary, it is
used, at times indiscriminately, to signify.one or both of two
distinct and separate ideas. Courts and commentators have
striven to correct this variable usage and bring clarity and
uniformity to the subject, but without noticeable success.86
These comments, reflecting little change from the turn of the
century,s7 express the same level of confusion that the Court had
tried to clear up in Hill.
Although many state cases from the late 1920s and the 1930s
suggested adoption of the Court's distinction in Hill,8" cases from the
imposes the burden of persuasion, not just the burden of establishing a prima facie case)).
The majority in Greenwich also suggested that the courts of appeals made a similar
distinction, and cited decisions from eight different courts as support. See Greenwich, 114
S. Ct. at 2256 n.*** (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 301 (D.C. Cir.
1945); Commissioner v. Bain Peanut Co., 134 F.2d 853, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 1943); Cory v.
Commissioner, 126 F.2d 689, 694 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942); Rossman v.
Blunt, 104 F.2d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1939); Department of Water & Power v. Anderson, 95
F.2d 577,583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 607 (1938); United States v. Knoles, 75 F.2d
557, 561 (8th Cir. 1935); Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1930)).
84. Hill, 260 U.S. at 594; see also Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2256 (quoting Holmes in
Hill).
85. See 1 BURR W. JONES, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES §§ 176, 310 (4th ed.
'1938); JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW
175-76 (1947); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 635-39
(1954); JOHN JAY MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 94 (5th ed. 1944).
However, McKelvey states that "the duty of the person alleging the case to prove it [sic]
... is the proper meaning of the term... .," seemingly implying that the proper meaning
of "burden of proof" is "burden of persuasion." MCKELVEY, supra, at 94.
86. JONES, supra note 85, at 309, quoted in Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2261 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
87. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Smith v. Hollander, 257 P. 577, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (stating that
"burden of proof" and "burden of producing evidence" are not the same); Behnke v.
President & Bd. of Trustees, 9 N.E.2d 232, 233 (III. 1937) (concluding that "burden of
proof" should be restricted to mean establishing a fact by preponderance of the evidence);
Thompson v. Dyson, 244 P. 867, 868 (Kan. 1926) (stating that "burden of proof" means
preponderance of the evidence); Carroll v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 279 P. 861, 864
(Or. 1929) (explaining that "burden of proof" is not to be confused with "burden of
evidence"); Chattanooga-Dayton Bus Line v. Lynch, 6 Tenn. App. 470, 479-81 (1927)
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late 1930s and 1940s again promoted the confusion.89 Contributing
to the ambiguity, many courts of appeals interpreted "burden of
proof" to mean "burden of persuasion,"' but others admitted that
"burden of proof" could mean either "burden of persuasion" or
"burden of production."'" Although less clearly, even the Supreme
Court apparently interpreted "burden of proof" as "burden of
production" in Heiner v. Donnan.' The Court suggested that "[a]
rebuttable [prima facie] presumption clearly is a rule of evidence
which has the effect of shifting the burden of proof."'93 In shifting
the burden of proof, this "prima facie presumption" acts to place
upon the opponent the duty of producing contrary evidence.94 Using
"burden of proof" in this sense comes close to using it in its "produ-
ction" sense, because shifting the burden of proof only makes sense
if "burden of proof" is used as burden of production.
(showing that "burden of proof' and "burden of evidence" are distinct concepts).
89. See In re Hampton's Estate, 127 P.2d 38, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (explaining that
"burden of proof' is used in several different senses); Wilson v. Findley, 275 N.W. 47, 56-
57 (Iowa 1937) (stating that "burden of proof" can mean "to establish a proposition" or
"to go forward with the evidence"); Nelson v. Hammett, 189 S.W.2d 238,243 (Mo. 1945)
(explaining that "burden of proof" has two distinct meanings). There were also state cases
in the 1940s which supported restricting "burden of proof" to "burden of persuasion." See,
e.g., Shiman Bros. & Co. v. Nebraska Nat'l Hotel Co., 18 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Neb. 1945)
(explaining that less confusion would result if "burden of proof" and "burden of evidence"
were kept distinct).
90. See, e.g., Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 178
F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1949) (admitting that there is much speculation on the meaning of
"burden of proof").
91. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bain Peanut Co., 134 F.2d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 1943);
Northwestern Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 134 F.2d 740,743 (9th Cir. 1943), affd,
321 U.S. 119 (1944); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 127 F.2d 378,
382 (9th Cir. 1942), affd, 324 U.S. 826 (1945); Wong Kam Chong v. United States, 111
F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1940); Department of Water and Power v. Anderson, 95 F.2d 577,
583 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 607 (1939); Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38
F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1930).
92. 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
93. Id. at 329 (citing Mobile, Jackson, & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S.
35, 43 (1910) (explaining that the legal effect of shifting the burden of probf is to cast the
duty of producing some evidence on the defendant)).
94. See Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 43; see also Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2260 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the Heiner court was in line with Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S.
1, 2 (1922), and Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1943), in holding that the
"burden of proof," used in the sense of "burden of production," could be placed on either
party).
95. Although the burden of producing evidence may shift, "[tihere is a ... mystic
doctrine, with tremendous authoritative backing, that burden of persuasion never shifts."
MAGUiRE, supra note 85, at 177 (emphasis added); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 85,
at 636 (discussing how the burden of producing evidence may shift).
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In the midst of these conflicting understandings of the phrase
"burden of proof," Congress implemented the APA with section 7(c)
and its allocation of "burden of proof."96 Reports of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that,
under the Act's "burden of proof," both parties to a proceeding had
a "general burden of coming forward with a prima facie case."'  The
House Report went further, explaining that, if either party failed to
meet its burden of persuasion, then that party would lose.98 Soon
after the APA's passage, the United States Attorney General
expressed confusion regarding section 7(c)'s "burden of proof." In his
manual, he explained that the phrase, as employed in the Act, seemed
to be synonymous with the "burden of going forward."'99 Although
commentators agreed with the Attorney General's conclusions, some
expressed dissatisfaction with the section.' 0 Regardless of their
96. The relevant portion of § 7(c) of the APA at issue in Greenwich provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the
agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or
rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts
thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.
Administrative Procedure Act, § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. 556(d) (1988).
97. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY], S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 270-71.
98. H.R. REP. No. 1980 at 36-37, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 97,
at 270-71. The House Report stated:
In other words, this section means that every proponent of a rule or order or the
denial thereof has the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence
therefor.... The first and second sentences of the section therefore mean that,
where a party having the burden of proceeding has come forward with a prima
facie and substantial case, he will prevail unless his evidence is discredited or
rebutted.
Id.
99. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 75
(1947) (footnote omitted); see also Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2262 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Attorney General's manual).
100. In its opinions on the then-proposed APA, the New York State Bar Association
and the New York City Bar Association indicated that "the first sentence [of § 7(c)] is
confusing... [and] should be eliminated from the bill." COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N AND ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, JOINT REPORT ON PROPOSED FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 16
(Dec. 26, 1945); see also Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2262 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the
New York report). More recent commentators have concluded without any lamentation
that "the term 'burden of proof' [in § 7(c)] was intended to denote the 'burden of going
forward.' " 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.42, at 486
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opinions, however, the general consensus for many years seems to
have been that no conflict existed between the true doubt rule and
the APA because "burden of proof' in the APA meant only the
"burden of production."
The first time the Supreme Court examined the meaning of
section 7(c)'s "burden of proof" was in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp.' In Transportation Management, the Court
considered, as a minor issue, whether regulations that placed the
burden of persuasion on the employer in unfair labor practice
hearings violated section 7(c)'s imposition of the "burden of proof'
on the proponent of a rule or order."° A unanimous Court
responded in a footnote that section 7(c) "determines only the burden
of going forward, not the burden of persuasion."1 3 Before Green-
wich, the Court had expressed no reservations about its conclusions
in Transportation Management, and even cited it in a subsequent
opinion. °4
Subsequent to Transportation Management, courts of appeals
considering the validity of the true doubt rule under section 7(c)
usually referred to the case because it seemed to provide clear and
conclusive evidence of the Court's understanding of "burden of proof'
in the APA. 5 With the Court's confidence that the Secretary of
(1985); 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.9, at 257-58 (2d
ed. 1980); 4 JACOB A. STEIN Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 24.02, at 24-25 (1994).
101. 462 U.S. 393 (1983). The Court had earlier examined the third sentence of § 7(c)
to see if it imposed a standard of "clear and convincing evidence" or merely a
"preponderance of the evidence" in the assessment of sanctions for antitrust violations.
See Steadman v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981). Although the
Steadman Court admitted that the "language of [7(c)]... is somewhat opaque concerning
the precise standard of proof," id. at 100, the majority concluded that Judiciary Committee
comments on the third sentence of § 7(c) indicated that Congress intended to impose a
"preponderance-of-the-evidence standard" on the parties, id. at 102; see H.R. REP. No.
1980 at 37, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 97, at 271; see also Steadman,
450 U.S. at 100-01 (analyzing the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee's
comments on § 7(c)). The Steadman Court did not look to the first sentence of § 7(c)'s
"burden of proof' as a standard of proof, perhaps because the Court believed the phrase
only imposed a "burden of production."
102. Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 403-04 n.7.
103. Id. (citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004, 1013-15
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. EPA, 431 U.S. 925 (1977)).
104. Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,660 (1989) (holding that in Title
VII disparate-impact cases lower courts and the Supreme Court had used the term
"burden of proof' to mean only "burden of production"); see also infra note 133.
105. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2264 (Souter, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Grizzle v. Mather,
994 F.2d 1093,1100 (4th Cir. 1993); Skukan v. Consolidation Coal Co., 993 F.2d 1228, 1235
(6th Cir. 1993); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs, 988 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1993).
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Labor knew how to apply his own regulations properly"6 and the
Court's acknowledgement that the Department often applied the true
doubt rule, °7 lower courts other than the Third Circuit did not seem
to question the consistency of the true doubt rule with the APA.
The Supreme Court's decision in Greenwich signals that
"preponderance of the evidence" will be the new standard to be met
by all claimants under acts applying the procedural rules of the
APA3 8 For the first time, the Court was asked to face the phrase
"burden of proof' in section 7(c) of the APA head on, rather than
merely as an incidental issue." In Greenwich, the Court reached
a surprising conclusion, not only because it replaced previous
interpretations of the APA's "burden of proof,""' but also because
in doing so, the Court overcame considerable precedent"' and
brought about a significant change in what seemed to be established
statutory interpretation112
Although the Court examined conflicting comments in legal
treatises and case law about the meaning of "burden of proof" before
1946, the majority was confident that the legal community had settled
on a single meaning for the phrase prior to the APA's passage."'
The Court acknowledged the frustration of writers at the turn of the
century with the ambiguity of the term,"4 but concluded that,
because writers in the 1930s and 1940s appeared less frustrated by the
phrase's dual meanings, usage of the term was settled at that time."5
Also, while relying on Hill v. Smith" 6 and post-Hill cases" 7 that
106. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484
U.S. 135, 138 (1987); see also supra note 29.
107. See Mullins Coal, 484 U.S. at 144 n.12; see also supra note 70.
108. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have displaced § 7(c) of the APA with
substitute legislation permitting application of the true doubt rule. See Greenwich, 114 S.
Ct. at 2254-55; see also supra notes 42-43.
109. At best, this was the situation in Steadman v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 450 U.S.
91 (1981), see supra note 101, and in Mullins Coal, see supra note 29. In Transportation
Management, the Court did examine § 7(c)'s "burden of proof," but only as a minor issue.
See supra notes 101-04, infra note 130, and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
113. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257.
114. Id. at 2255-56 (citing ELLIOTr, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 129, at 184-85 & n.3 (1904);
THAYER, supra note 55, at 355, 384-85; 4 WIGMORE, supra note 76, at 3521-22, 3524-29).
115. IE (citing JOHN J. MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 64 (4th
ed. 1932); WILLIAM P. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE 143 (6th ed. 1944)).
116. 260 U.S. 592 (1923); Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2256; see also supra notes 46, 81-82
and accompanying text (discussing this case and its holding that "burden of proof' should
mean "burden of persuasion").
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used "burden of proof" to mean "burden of persuasion," the majority
seemingly overlooked cases that used the phrase to mean "burden of
production.""1 8 Overall, the Court's historical analysis may have
failed to consider that the secondary meaning of "burden of proof"
as "burden of production" might still be prominent in some sections
of the legal community."9
Nevertheless, having concluded that, by 1946, "burden of proof"
meant "burden of persuasion" in virtually all legal circles, the Court
suggested that Congress intended to adopt this meaning in the
APA."0 After holding that Congress intended "burden of proof"
in section 7(c) to mean "burden of persuasion," the Court ack-
nowledged that it had come to a different conclusion in Transpor-
tation Management.' Although that case had often been cited as
the definitive statement on section 7(c)'s "burden of proof"" the
majority felt that, because the conclusion in Transportation
Management was only cursory, the decision did not warrant "the same
level of deference we typically give our precedents."''" Because the
true doubt rule imposed only a burden of production on claimants,
the Court concluded that it violated section 7(c) of the APAY4
117. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2256; see also supra note 88 (listing the post-Hill
cases).
118. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing state cases, courts of
appeals cases, and one Supreme Court case that used "burden of proof' in its "burden of
coming forward with evidence" sense).
119. The majority suggested that the "commentators almost unanimously agreed that
the definition was settled." Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257. But see supra notes 72-79 and
accompanying text (suggesting that the secondary meaning was still quite prominent).
120. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257. The Court suggested that Congress was aware of
the predominant meaning of "burden of proof' in legal circles because it used that
meaning in the Communications Act of 1934. Id. (citing the Communications Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 94-309, §§ 2(c)-8, 90 Stat. 683 (codified as amended in various sections of 47
U.S.C.), which made a clear distinction between the terms "burden of proof" and "burden
of production"); see also supra note 46. Although the majority examined the legislative
history of section 7(c), its conclusion that, even if Congress "intended to impose a burden
of production, [this did] not mean that Congress did not also intend to impose a burden
of persuasion," Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2258-59, seems suspicious. The Court was only
suggesting that the legislative history provided incomplete evidence of Congress's
intentions in the APA; in its analysis, however, the majority may have also denied that this
was the best evidence of Congress's intentions.
121. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257; see also supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text
(explaining that, in a cursory footnote, the unanimous Court in Transportation
Management concluded that § 7(c) only imposed a "burden of production" on either
party).
122. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
123. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257.
124. Id. at 2259.
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The three dissenters found that the phrase "burden of proof" had
not reached a settled meaning before 19 46 ."r Admitting that the
preferred meaning of "burden of proof" today may be "burden of
persuasion,' 2 6 Justice Souter argued that "commentators did not
think the ambiguity of the phrase had disappeared before passage of
the APA."' 7 Because "burden of proof" had no settled meaning,
the dissenters placed great reliance on the legislative history and
interpretations of Congress's intended meaning after the APA's pas-
sage." To the dissenters, the language of the legislative reports,
viewed in light of the unsettled meaning of the phrase, clearly
indicated that Congress intended "burden of proof" in section 7(c) of
the APA to mean only "burden of production".,
Adding to the dissenters' frustration was the fact that the Court's
conclusions directly conflicted with the statement in Transportation
Management regarding section 7(c). 3 The dissenters noted that
" '[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for... Congress remains free to alter what
we have done.' ,131 Indeed, Congress had not disapproved of any
ALI's application of the true doubt rule to BLBA or LWCHA claims
before or after Transportation Management.32  Because numerous
Department of Labor hearings, courts of appeals decisions, and
evidence treatises had relied on Transportation Management for the
conclusion that "burden of proof" in section 7(c) meant only "burden
of production," the dissenters saw the majority opinion as an unwise
uprooting of settled statutory interpretation. 3
125. Id. at 2261 (Souter, ., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2260 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2261 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 2261-62 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text. The dissenters first looked to the Attorney General's manual as
supplemental material to help interpret Congress's meaning. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at
2262 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text. Although the
dissenters also examined several treatises, only one of these was published prior to
Transportation Management, calling into question these treatises' conclusions about the
APA. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2262 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing DAVIS, supra note
100, at 257-58).
129. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2261-62 (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 2263 (Souter, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,172-73 (1989)); accord
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986); Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
132. At a minimum, Congress had not expressed any frustration with or disapproval of
the practice of applying the true doubt rule to claims under the BLBA or the LHWCA.
133. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2262-66 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissenters cited seven
supporting courts of appeals decisions rendered between 1984 and 1993. See id. (citing
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Although different historical understandings between the Court's
majority and dissent are not ordinarily disturbing, they are in
Greenwich because the opinion focused on historical
interpretation."4  Upon close examination, it is difficult to
understand the majority's conclusion that little or no ambiguity about
the meaning of ."burden of proof' existed when Congress passed the
APA. 135 The fact that "burden of proof" was used in the sense of
"burden of production" both before and after enactment of the
APA"36 suggests that the majority may have presented a "selective
history" to support a particular conclusion rather than examining the
historical record fully. Even if the Court's holding is correct, then, the
gaps in the majority's historical recitation-many of which were filled
by the dissent37 -render debatable the Greenwich Court's method
of determining the meaning of "burden of proof"
More important than the process used by the Court to resolve the
issues in Greenwich, however, are the potential effects of its decision.
Not only has application of the true doubt rule been eliminated
because of procedural rules, but the Court's conclusions also raise
questions about judicial review of agency decisions and the use of the
phrase "burden of proof' outside of the APA.
The Greenwich opinion eradicates the established practice of
favoring workers' compensation claimants when their evidence is
equal to that of their employers, a principle that had been embodied
in the true doubt rule.'38 However, rather than examining the
appropriateness of the true doubt rule in workers' compensation
Skukan v. Consolidation Coal Co., 993 F.2d 1228,1236-38 (6th Cir. 1993); Freeman United
Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 988 F.2d 706,
711 (7th Cir. 1993); Dazzio v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 71, 77 (5th Cir. 1992); Merritt v. United
States, 960 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1992); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886
F.2d 355, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bosma v. United States Dep't of Agric., 754 F.2d 804, 810
(9th Cir. 1984); Alameda City Training & Employment Bd./Assoc. Comm. Action Program
v. Donovan, 743 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1984)). The dissenters added that the Court
itself had applied Transportation Management in 1989 to support the proposition in a Title
VII suit that "an employer's 'burden of proof' ... should have been understood to mean
an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden," Ward's Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (citing Transportation Management, 462 U.S at 404 n.7).
The dissenters noted that the Ward's Cove Court was aware of the true doubt rule that
presupposed § 7(c)'s reading in Transportation Management. Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2265
(Souter, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2255-57.
135. See id at 2257; see also supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
136. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes
72-79, 85-95 and accompanying text.
137. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2259-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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cases, the majority's analysis was limited to interpretation of a
procedural phrase. Perhaps because the Court wished to standardize
placement of the "burden of persuasion" throughout federal agency
adjudications, 139 the majority's conclusion eliminates the flexibility
that the true doubt rule gave ALJs to err on the side of workers.
140
Consistency throughout the executive branch is important, but the
elimination of a fifty-year-old practice approved of or overlooked by
Congress and the courts for that same period of time seems to be a
drastic step to take in the name of standardization. Considering that
the APA is intended to serve only as a procedural overlay, it should
not be used to overturn the purposes and goals of acts that adopt it,
such as the BLBA and LHWCA.141
The BLBA, LHWCA, and other workers' compensation acts
create an insurance-like system that, while perhaps providing benefits
in a few inappropriate cases, is designed to compensate as many
needy and deserving beneficiaries as arise. Employers benefit from
the system, too, because they avoid more costly tort claims by
disabled workers. Without the true doubt rule-which the
Department of Labor had developed and applied in accordance with
its mandate to meet the congressional purposes of the LHWCA and
BLBA-disabled workers with cases that are especially difficult to
prove may be left without a remedy.142
139. See id. at 2259 (explaining that the APA was intended to provide a standardized
procedural framework for hearings in different federal agencies).
140. Although the Greenwich decision imposes a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard on claimants under the BLBA or LHWCA, the majority acknowledged
Congress's recognition that these claims are hard to prove. Id. at 2259. However, the
Court explained that several statutory presumptions other than the true doubt rule operate
in the claimants' favor. Id. (referring to 33 U.S.C. § 920 (1988); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1988);
20 C.F.R. §§ 718.301-306 (1993)). The Court concluded that the true doubt rule went one
step too far. Id.
141. See id. at 2254 (arguing that because the BLBA was designed to give claimants the
benefit of reasonable doubt, it must not have adopted APA provisions that conflict with
this purpose). The fact that, for 48 years since the APA was passed, Congress had not
expressed any concern over application of the true doubt rule suggests that Congress did
not intend for the APA to override its goals for the LHWCA or the BLBA. Absent such
intentions, Congress probably meant "burden of proof' to mean only "burden of
production," and the majority in Greenwich should not have allowed its contemporary
understanding of "burden of proof" to control its determination of congressional intent of
50 years ago.
142. Many of these disabled workers may be coal miners claiming benefits under the
BLBA, because establishing the existence of black lung disease and a causal link to
employment are especially difficult to prove. Yauk v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs, 912 F.2d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Because the true doubt rule was the application of a principle
developed in accord with the Department of Labor's mandates in the
BLBA and LHWCA, the holding in Greenwich may create confusion
with respect to judicial review of an agency's statutory
interpretation.43 Although agency interpretations of statutes cannot
bind courts,'" "considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer."'45 In Greenwich, the majority essentially
afforded no deference to the agency's interpretation, even though the
Department of Labor's practice of applying the true doubt rule was
an exceedingly reasonable approach based on Congress's mandates for
both the BLBA and LHWCA and on the Court's own interpretation
of section 7(c) in Transportation Management.'46 Although the
Court may return to its policy of deferring to reasonable agency
statutory interpretations in the future, Greenwich will stand out as
inconsistent with those decisions. Perhaps the inconsistency will be
justified because Greenwich involved interpretation and application of
a procedural act, but such a justification begs the question of why the
Court should allow procedural matters to take precedence over the
arguably more important policy issue that the true doubt rule was
designed to further.
If Greenwich does not disturb the state of judicial review of
agency decisions, the opinion nonetheless may affect any federal
statutory scheme that involves application of the term "burden of
proof." Statutes that shift the "burden of proof" rather than the
"burden of production" may be open to challenge on the basis that,
according to Greenwich, the "burden of proof" cannot be shifted. In
fact, because the Supreme Court has determined in Greenwich that
"burden of proof" only means "burden of persuasion," any statute
that uses the phrase in its "burden of production" sense may also be
challenged. Although courts may limit the holding in Green-
143. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2267 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the true
doubt rule accords with Congress's order to the Department of Labor to create standards
giving the benefit of the doubt to employees under the BLBA and that the true doubt rule
applied a reasonable interpretation of the Department of Labor's own regulations). But
see Respondent Maher Terminals' Brief at 4-5, Greenwich (No. 93-744) (arguing that the
APA is "not a statute that the agency administers" and therefore no deference is owed to
the agency's interpretation).
144. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983).
145. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
146. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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wich-that "burden of proof" means "burden of persuasion"-to cases
arising under the APA, such a limitation would betray the Court's
real conclusion that, when the party using the phrase is aware of this
"settled" meaning for the phrase, "burden of proof" can mean only
"burden of persuasion." 1
47
Whether or not Greenwich produces any long-term effects
beyond the elimination of the true doubt rule, the parties to several
appellate cases that were pending when Greenwich was decided are
sure to feel its short-term effects.'48 Of these cases, all of which
involve claims by coal miners for black lung benefits, the first to be
considered after Greenwich was Miller v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs,'49 which may be an example of what will
follow in the remaining cases. Miller was pending because the
employer asserted that the true doubt rule applied by the AL
violated section 7(c) of the APA.50 The Court, relying on Green-
wich, remanded the case for determination of whether a prepon-
derance of the evidence in favor of the claimant existed.' Al-
though the ultimate ruling of the AUJ may be the same in this
particular case, it seems that, as a whole, employers should expect
more victories in close pneumoconiosis claims."
As the courts adjust to the legal effects of Greenwich, it will also
be interesting to see how Congress reacts. Considering that the
BLBA and LHWCA were implemented to further the interest of
workers, Congress may act to withdraw adoption of section 7(c)'s
procedural rules from both the BLBA and the LHWCA in light of
the Court's decision in Greenwich. The integrity of both the APA
and the compensation acts would then remain intact, and the true
doubt rule could be reinstated.
147. See Greenwich, 114 S. Ct. at 2257 (concluding that Congress intended to use
"burden of proof" in the sense generally prevailing at the time of the APA's passage).
148. See Miller v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 1994 WL
478058, at **5 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 1994); Ratliff v. Jewell Ridge Coal Co., 1994 WL 198824,
at **2 (4th Cir. May 20, 1994).
149. 1994 WL 478048.
150. See id. at **5.
151. Id.
152. It has not been unusual for a few positive readings of x-rays or other tests for
pneumoconiosis to outweigh a greater number of negative readings under the true doubt
rule. Without the true doubt rule, AIJs may be forced to rule against the claimant in
these types of cases. It is unclear whether the relative monetary resources of the claimant
and employer correspond to the numbers of readings in their favor that they are able to
submit into evidence, but such a relationship appears likely.
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While the Greenwich opinion may be a significant step toward
ending the confusion over the meaning of the phrase "burden of
proof," other effects of the Court's conclusions raise the question of
whether it was worth the trouble. The majority's arguably incomplete
analysis may frustrate the efforts of some deserving BLBA claimants
to win compensation for their disabilities, in direct contradiction of
Congress's expressed desire to "promulgate standards which give the
benefit of any doubt to the coal miner." '153 Moreover, the opinion
raises serious doubts over the Court's position on both agencies'
statutory interpretations and the value of policy concerns over
procedural matters. Although standardization of procedures for
agency hearings may be admirable, its seems truly doubtful whether
the Greenwich Court has furthered congressional objectives.
JEFFREY THOMAS SKINNER
153. S. REP. No. 209, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 36825-26 (1978).
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